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 Abstract 
 
Classical negotiation models are weak in supporting real-world business negotiations 
because these models often assume that the preference information of each negotiator 
is made public. Although parametric learning methods have been proposed for 
acquiring the preference information of negotiation opponents, these methods suffer 
from the strong assumptions about the specific utility function and negotiation 
mechanism employed by the opponents. Consequently, it is difficult to apply these 
learning methods to the heterogeneous negotiation agents participating in 
e-Marketplaces. This paper illustrates the design, development, and evaluation of a 
non-parametric negotiation knowledge discovery method which is underpinned by the 
well-known Bayesian learning paradigm. According to our empirical testing, the 
novel knowledge discovery method can speed up the negotiation processes while 
maintaining the negotiation effectiveness. To our best knowledge, this is the first 
non-parametric negotiation knowledge discovery method developed and evaluated in 
the context of multi-issue bargaining over e-Marketplaces.  
Key words: Bayesian Learning, Knowledge Discovery, Multi-Issue Bargaining, 
e-Business. 
 
1. Introduction 
With the rapid growth of the number of business transactions completed over 
e-marketplaces, it is desirable to improve the level of autonomy, and hence the 
efficiency of these electronic markets. With reference to the Business-to-Business 
Transaction (BBT) model [22], negotiation is one important stage within the business 
transaction processing cycle. Although various auctioning mechanisms have been 
examined [52], automated multi-party multi-issue negotiation mechanism is not a 
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common feature of existing e-Marketplaces. Generally speaking, auction is one 
simple form of negotiation, that is, single issue (price) negotiation. On the other hand, 
bargaining is a more complex form of negotiation which involves two or more parties 
negotiating over multiple issues simultaneously [4,9,33]. Automated negotiations 
have long been a hot research topic and received considerable attentions from a 
variety of research disciplines such as Economics [37,50], Social 
Psychology [3,43,44], Operational Research [11,23], Distributed Artificial 
Intelligence [13,55], and Agent Mediated e-Commerce [9,21,22].  
 
Nevertheless, as the assumptions of classical negotiation models (e.g., availability of 
the opponents’ payoff functions) do not match the characteristics of the real-world 
dynamic negotiation environment, it is not easy to apply these models to support 
e-Business negotiations. A knowledge discovery mechanism for automatically 
learning the opponents’ preferences is one of the ways to address the shortcomings of 
existing negotiation models. Knowledge discovery (or data mining) refers to the 
non-trivial process of identifying valid, novel, potentially useful, and ultimately 
understandable patterns in data [15]. In the context of automated negotiations, the 
novel patterns are the negotiation preferences (i.e., the frequently proposed 
negotiation options). This kind of pattern is ultimately understandable and potentially 
useful because they can be applied to improve both negotiation effectiveness (e.g., 
joint payoffs) and negotiation efficiency [32]. This paper focuses on the development 
and evaluation of a novel negotiation knowledge discovery method which can be used 
to enhance multi-issue negotiation (bargaining) models so that these models can be 
applied to support business negotiations in e-Marketplaces. The proposed negotiation 
knowledge discovery method is underpinned by machine learning techniques in 
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general, and the naive Bayesian classifier in particular [35,42,53].  
1.1 Background 
Negotiations are ubiquitous and conducted in various contexts such as the formation 
of virtual enterprises [22], managing labor disputes [55], resolving hostage crisis [60], 
streamlining logistic supply chain [58], refining system requirements [18], etc. 
Negotiation refers to the process by which group of agents (human or software) 
communicate with one another in order to reach a mutually acceptable agreement on 
resource allocation (distribution) [34]. When multi-agent technologies are applied to 
automated negotiations, software agents are often used to capture human negotiators’ 
preferences and these agents can autonomously bargain with the opponents on behalf 
of their human users [9,39]. Software agents are encapsulated computer systems 
situated in some environments such as the Internet and are capable of flexible, 
autonomous actions in that environment to meet their design objectives [26,61]. In 
typical e-marketplaces [7,25,28,54], buyer agents and seller agents exchange their 
demands (or supplies) of some products (or services) with the mediation of the 
administrator agents which enforce specific negotiation protocols in the electronic 
markets.  
 
Learning is an important behavior of human negotiators and it can be used to improve 
negotiation outcomes in general [39,44,56,62]. Since negotiators tend to keep their 
preferences (e.g., reservation prices) private to protect self-payoffs, a learning 
mechanism can facilitate a negotiation agent to discover the hidden agenda of its 
opponent so as to improve the bargaining process (e.g., not accepting the opponent’s 
counter-offer until the opponent’s reservation price is reached). In general, it is 
believed that an agent’s ability of acquiring the knowledge about its negotiation 
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opponents is critical for effective negotiations in the context of e-Commerce [9]. 
  
A stylized international business negotiation adopted from Rangaswamy and Shell [45] 
is used to illustrate a typical multi-issue negotiation scenario and the prominent issues 
arising in such a context. The negotiation setting involves a Hungarian buyer of a 
medical company who gives the highest priority to the type of currency for trade 
settlement due to the shortage of foreign currencies in Hungary. On the other hand, 
the seller is a U.S. medical equipment supplier who sees delivery date as the most 
important issue due to the shortage of inventory. Table 1 highlights the ordinal 
preferences of the Hungarian buyer and the U.S. seller over four negotiation issues 
and four options pertaining to each of these issues. The most preferred issue or option 
is ranked (1). Unlike single issue distributive negotiations (i.e., zero sum game), 
multi-issue integrative negotiations allow a larger number of alternatives to be 
explored by the negotiators such that a “win-win” rather than a “win-lose” situation 
can be attained [20]. For example, “currency” is the most important issue for the 
Hungarian buyer but the least important issue for the U.S. seller; it is possible to reach 
a compromise such that the buyer can pay in Hungarian currency, whereas the seller 
is compensated by having a longer delivery period of 14 months. Finding deals which 
best satisfy the preference of each party has significant impact on B2B e-Commerce 
because it helps maintaining persistent business relationships; eventually it may 
reduce the trading costs (e.g., the costs for searching new partners) for all the parties. 
 [INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]. 
If the preference information as disclosed in Table 1 is available to each negotiator, it 
is not difficult to identify the best deal satisfying the major preference of each party 
by using classical game theoretic methods [46,50,59]. However, to protect individual 
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business benefits, the Hungarian buyer may not be willing to disclose its preference 
information (e.g., its upper reservation price of 225 000$ , ) to the U.S. seller. The 
same attitude is also applied to the U.S. seller. Under such circumstance, the 
Hungarian buyer does not know that she can bargain with the U.S. seller to maintain 
her currency favor while giving up her delivery preference. For a small negotiation 
space involving only a few issues and options, the negotiators may exercise a “try and 
error” approach to find an agreement. However, the negotiation space grows 
exponentially for a typical business negotiation scenario which consists of dozens of 
issues and options. On one hand, human cognitive load is too limited to effectively 
explore a large negotiation space, and on the other hand, constrained resources (e.g., 
limited time) may prevent the negotiators from taking a resources demanding 
deliberation approach. Consequently, sub-optimal rather than optimal deals are often 
reached and the phenomenon of “leaving some money on the table” occurs [44]. It has 
been observed that advanced information technology can alleviate information 
overload and facilitate human decision making in general [24]. This observation 
motivates us to explore knowledge discovery method for the development of practical 
negotiation mechanisms to assist human negotiators.  
1.2 The Problems of Learning the Opponents’ Preferences 
Although classical game theoretic negotiation models [50,59] provide excellent 
theoretical analysis of the optimal outcomes (e.g., Nash equilibrium) for certain 
scenarios, these normative theories do not provide specific instructions to guide the 
negotiators to choose the courses of actions leading to the optimal outcomes. Another 
concern for the practical use of these normative theories is that the search space of 
considering all the possible strategies and interactions in order to identify the 
equilibrium solutions grows exponentially. The third problem of existing negotiation 
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models [13,14,49,50,59] is that they assume the availability of complete information 
about a negotiation space (e.g., information about the opponents’ preferences).  
 
To address the problem of assuming the availability of the opponents’ private 
preference information in automated negotiation systems, some studies have been 
done to examine the feasibility of automatically learning the opponents’ preferences 
based on the negotiation histories [6,8,19,29,36,38,62]. With the learning capability, a 
negotiation agent can gradually acquire some knowledge about the opponents’ 
preferences so as to improve subsequent negotiation outcomes. However, most of the 
learning mechanisms discussed in the literature are based on a parametric learning 
model where a specific negotiation method (e.g., the TDT method) and utility 
function (e.g., a linearly additive function) are assumed. As participants in an 
e-Marketplace have absolute freedom in terms of the negotiation mechanisms and the 
utility functions they would like to employ, it is difficult to apply a parametric 
knowledge discovery method to serve the heterogeneous negotiation agents 
participating in an e-Marketplace. Although probabilistic learning approach has been 
examined for acquiring the opponents’ preferences, existing probabilistic approaches 
rely on the availability of some priori probability distributions of the opponents’ 
utility values [5,62]. Nevertheless, it is very unlikely that the opponents will disclose 
such information in a competitive business negotiation environment.  
1.3 Contributions 
The main contributions of our research work are two folds; from the theoretical stand 
point, we contribute to the design, development, and empirical testing of a novel 
negotiation knowledge discovery method which is essential to address the 
shortcomings of existing automated negotiation mechanisms. In particular, the 
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knowledge acquisition problem not effectively resolved by previous Bayesian 
learning methods [5,62] and the parametric learning methods [6,8,19,36,38] is 
addressed by our current study. The proposed negotiation knowledge discovery 
mechanism can continuously monitor the negotiation dialogs between an agent and its 
opponents so that the preferences of the opponents can be induced to improve 
subsequent negotiation outcomes. 
  
From the practical stand point, our research work opens the door to the development 
of practical bargaining mechanisms to improve the effectiveness and the efficiency of 
modern e-Marketplaces. In fact, B2C e-Marketplaces such as eBay.com and B2B 
e-Marketplaces such as ChemConnect.com or Alibaba.com have become increasingly 
more popular. However, only single issue (e.g., price) negotiation support (i.e., 
auctioning) is available in these e-Marketplaces. The proposed negotiation knowledge 
discovery method and the corresponding probabilistic negotiation decision making 
model can provide e-Marketplaces with more sophisticated negotiation mechanisms. 
As a whole, our research work contributes to advance the e-Commerce practice by 
developing intelligent software tools to enhance the throughput of e-Marketplaces.  
1.4 Outline of the paper 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. A comparison between previous 
research work with ours is given in Section 2. The system architecture of negotiation 
agents mediated e-Marketplace is outlined in Section 3. The main elements of an 
automated negotiation model are described in Section 4. Section 5 illustrates the 
computational details of the novel negotiation knowledge discovery method and the 
corresponding probabilistic bargaining mechanism. Section 6 describes the 
quantitative evaluation of our probabilistic bargaining system empowered by the 
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non-parametric negotiation knowledge discovery mechanism. Finally, we offer 
concluding remarks and describe future direction of our research work. 
  
2. Related Work 
A utility learning algorithm is proposed to elicit the utility function of an agent who 
acts in a sequential decision making problem [6]. An agent’s utility function U  is 
assumed linearly additive such as 
1
( ) m i iiU d α µ==∑ , where iα  is the coefficient 
(weight) for the corresponding subutility iµ . It is also assumed that the coefficient 
iα  is common knowledge for all the agents. As a result, the utility learning problem 
becomes learning the subutility vector 1 … [0 1]
m
mµ µ µ=< , , >∈ , . Essentially, 
estimating the values of the subutility vector corresponding to making a move in a 
hyper-cube [0 1]m,  such that each move is consistent with all the observable patterns. 
By observing the recent actions of an oblivious opponent, a posterior probability 
density function ( )q µ  can be induced to estimate the opponent’s utility function. In 
particular, Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) techniques are applied to generate a 
set of samples from ( )q µ  so as to predict the means of the subutilities. Our 
negotiation knowledge discovery approach indirectly estimates the preferences of the 
opponent agent by computing the posterior conditional probability ( )Pr accept o| , 
that is, the probability of the opponent accepting a potential offer o . Unlike the 
approach adopted in [6], we do not assume that a prior probability distribution such as 
( )p µ  is available nor the coefficient iα  (i.e., the weight of a negotiation issue) is 
common knowledge for all the participating agents.  
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Kernel density estimation has been applied to learn a negotiation opponent’s 
preferences in the context of multi-issue bi-lateral negotiations [8]. Basically, a 
linearly additive utility function such as 
1
( ) ( )nj j ji i iiU o w V o== ∑  is assumed; the 
function ( )jU o  represent agent j ’s utility for an offer o , whereas jiw  is the 
weight of the i  negotiation issue for agent j  and ( )ji iV o  represents agent j ’s 
valuation (subutility) for the i th element of the offer o . Kernel density estimation is 
used to estimate the weight jiw  for each negotiation issue i  of the opponent agent 
j  according to the negotiation history. However, there is no discussion in terms of 
how to estimate the subutility ( )ji iV o  which is also an important element of a utility 
function [8]. One problem of this approach is that the utility learning method is only 
applicable to a specific negotiation model (e.g., the fuzzy similarity trade-off 
model [13]). In addition, the utility learning method is not easily applied to deal with 
discrete symbolic issues. Our negotiation knowledge discovery method is more 
general and it does not assume a particular form of utility function (linear or nonlinear) 
nor a specific negotiation mechanism to be adopted by an agent. It can be applied to 
multi-issue negotiations involving both quantitative and qualitative issue domains.  
 
A learning algorithm is proposed for single instance electronic negotiations where a 
negotiation agent may not meet its opponent in the e-Marketplace before [36]. 
Assuming that the opponents employ the Time-Dependent Behavioral Tactic 
(TDT) [12], the derivatives of the Taylor’s series approximation of the TDT function 
can be constructed based on several initial offers from the opponent. In particular, five 
parameters of the TDT formula are derived from the derivatives of the Taylor’s series. 
In contrast, our negotiation knowledge discovery method tries to estimate the 
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probability of acceptance of an offer based on the probability distributions induced 
from the negotiation history. There is no explicit assumption about a particular 
negotiation model employed by the opponents.  
 
Naive Bayesian classification has been applied to develop negotiation agents in the 
context of multi-agent co-ordination [5]. Negotiation is treated as a refinement 
process (a hill-climbing search) based on an agreement tree. Each agent employs a 
refinement bias function (i.e., a utility function) to narrow their search. The 
refinement function is expressed as: 
{ }
( ) ( ) ( )agroup a bb A aU o U o U o∈ −= +∑ , where 
( )aU o  is agent a ’s own utility function and { } ( )bb A a U o∈ −∑  represents agent a ’s 
belief about the total payoff generated for its opponents. An agent can learn others’ 
payoff functions by employing the naive Bayesian classifier 
( ) ( )
( )( )
i j ij
Pr c Pr e c
i Pr oPr c o
|∏| = , 
where ic  represents the discretized utility value (i.e., a class) and je  is one of the 
features of an offer o . Nevertheless, one main problem of this approach is the 
assumption that the opponent will disclose its preference information (e.g., the prior 
probability ( )j iPr e c| ) so that an agent can construct the training examples. 
Unfortunately, this assumption is inappropriate for many real-world applications. 
Instead of directly estimating the utility values attached to the opponents’ offers, our 
approach estimates the probability of an offer to be accepted by the opponent (i.e., 
( )Pr accept o| ) based on the negotiation history.  
 
Zeng and Sycara [62] have developed a sequential negotiation model called Bazaar. It 
is believed that an agent’s belief about the opponent’s true reservation price could be 
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computed according to the posterior probability 
1
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) i in
k kk
Pr H Pr o H
i Pr o H Pr H
Pr H o
=
|
|| = ∑ , where 
( )iPr H  characterizes the probability distribution of the opponent’s reservation prices 
and is assumed public information in the negotiation system. Moreover, domain 
knowledge in the form of conditional probabilities ( )iPr o H|  describing the chance 
of receiving an offering price o  given the opponent’s true reservation price iH  is 
assumed available. This approach suffers from the problem of assuming the 
availability of the opponents’ private information (e.g., the true reservation price). We 
propose an efficient negotiation knowledge discovery method for estimating the 
probability of offer acceptance by the opponent without the assumption of the 
availability of the opponents’ private information. Moreover, our proposed Bayesian 
learning mechanism is extended to deal with multiple negotiation issues.  
 
Oliver has applied a genetic algorithm (GA) to develop the decision making and the 
learning mechanisms of adaptive negotiation agents [39,40,41]. The particular GA 
makes use of a binary encoding scheme with each chromosome representing a 
negotiation threshold. An agent’s concession making process is driven by the 
evolution of the population of chromosomes. Standard genetic operators such as 
uniform cross-over and mutation are used to evolve the populations. After executing 
an evolution process (e.g., evolving 20 generations), a chromosome will be selected as 
the current solution. An incoming offer from the opponent is then evaluated based on 
the negotiation threshold encoded on the chosen chromosome. Our learning 
mechanism discussed in this paper is underpinned by Bayesian learning rather than 
evolutionary algorithm. There is another hybrid preference learning method which 
combines evolutionary learning with simulated annealing [19]. Moreover, parametric 
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utility learning method has also been extended to handle the cases where inconsistent 
agent behavior may arise [38]. 
 
3. System Architecture 
The system architecture of our Web services and software agents mediated 
e-Marketplace is depicted in Figure 1. Our system architecture is designed with 
reference to a sound B2B business model, namely the Business-to-Business 
Transaction model (BBT) [22]. With reference to Figure 1, a service buyer (e.g., a 
computer wholesaler) or its dedicated software agent can search for a directory 
service (e.g., the UDDI registry [57]) based on business names, service types, or 
interface ID numbers via a client program. Once an appropriate e-marketplace (e.g., a 
computer market) is identified, a connection point (i.e., a URL) and a service contract 
specified by the Web Service Description Language (WSDL) can be retrieved. If the 
service interface is of a known type, dynamic proxies can be generated to access the 
service. The e-Marketplace service could be provided by a trusted third party (e.g., a 
commercial bank). Similarly, a service seller (e.g., a computer manufacturer) or its 
dedicated software agent can search for the UDDI business registry to look up 
suitable e-Marketplace to sell their products or services.  
[INSERT  FIGURE 1 HERE]. 
The buyer (seller) agents will join the e-Marketplace to search for suitable products 
providers (consumers) on behalf of their human users. This process corresponds to the 
“Partnership Formation” and the “Product Brokering” stages of the BBT model [22]. 
The market administrator agents are responsible for providing market information 
(e.g., products and their descriptions) to each participating trading agent in the 
e-Marketplace. In addition, the administrator agent is also responsible for enforcing a 
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pre-defined negotiation protocol (e.g., the alternate offering protocol) for the 
particular e-Marketplace. Once a buyer (seller) identifies suitable sellers (buyers), it 
can start to negotiate with these trading partners (e.g., making offers). This marks the 
beginning of the “Negotiation” stage of the BBT model. As shown in Figure 1, each 
agent will employ their own negotiation mechanism to negotiate with its opponents, 
and each agent may not realize the preferences of its opponents. There is not a central 
decision making mechanism to determine resource/service allocation (distribution) in 
the e-Marketplace.  
 
Each agent’s negotiation strategy is characterized by the negotiation preferences 
initially specified by their human user (e.g., a business manager). The user will 
specify the utility function, that is, the valuations of negotiation issues and the 
valuations of options for each issue. To make the negotiation process more effective 
and efficient, a negotiation agent can gradually learn the opponents’ negotiation 
preferences based on the previous and the current exchanges of offers captured in the 
corresponding negotiation history files. Basically, an agent will maintain a history of 
negotiation dialogs with each of its trading partners. Based on the novel negotiation 
knowledge discovery mechanism discussed in Section 5, the preferences of the 
trading partners can be discovered to improve the agent’s subsequent negotiation 
strategies (e.g., to concede faster). As a result, the throughput of the whole 
e-Marketplace can be improved. 
  
A rich conceptual model for automated negotiations can be extended to include a 
human behavior module which characterizes the social behavior aspects when human 
agents participate in negotiation processes. The modeling and development of the 
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human behavior module can be based on the theory of reasoned action (TRA) [16]; 
the overall negotiation process (e.g., the trade-off process) can be conceptualized by a 
process-oriented model [51]. Development of the human behavior model and the 
conceptual negotiation process can form another line of future research. In fact, 
preliminary work of employing the notion of beliefs to model negotiation processes 
has been conducted before [30]. 
  
4. The Main Elements of a Negotiation Mechanism 
An alternate offering negotiation protocol, a variant of the monotonic concession 
protocol [47], can be adopted in the e-Marketplaces. Automated negotiation proceeds 
in a discrete series of rounds and is mediated by the administrator agent. In each 
round, each negotiation agent makes an offer in alternate order. If these offers overlap, 
it means that an agreement is reached. If the offers do not overlap, negotiation 
proceeds to the next round where the agents make a concession. If an agreement is not 
reached after the deadline is passed, the negotiation process will be terminated with a 
conflict. The negotiation mechanism illustrated in this section is based on 
multi-attribute utility theory (MAUT) [27].  
 
A negotiation space Neg =  P A D U T< , , , , >  is a 5-tuple which consists of a finite 
set of negotiation parties (agents) P , a set of attributes (i.e., negotiation issues) A  
understood by every agent p P∈ , a set of attribute domains D  for A , and a set of 
utility functions U  with each function opU U∈  for an agent p P∈ . An attribute 
domain is denoted 
ia
D  where 
ia
D D∈  and ia A∈ . A utility function pertaining to 
an agent p  is defined by: 
1 2
… [0 1]
n
o
p a a aU D D D: × × × ,6 . Each agent p  has a 
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deadline dpt T∈ . It is assumed that information about P A D, ,  is provided by the 
administrator agents in an e-Marketplace. A multi-lateral negotiation situation can be 
modeled as many one-to-one bi-lateral negotiations where a negotiation agent p  
maintains a separate negotiation dialog with each opponent. In each negotiation round, 
an agent will make an offer to each of its opponents in turn. When multiple 
counter-offers are received from the trading partners, the agent can focus on the most 
favorable counter-offer evaluated according to its own utility (payoff) function opU .  
4.1 Offer Representation 
An offer 
1 2
…
na a a
o d d d=< , , , >G  is a n-tuple of attribute values (intervals) pertaining 
to a finite set of attributes 1 2{ ... }nA a a a= , , , . An offer can also be viewed as a vector 
of attribute values (i.e., negotiation options) in a geometric negotiation space with 
each dimension representing a negotiation issue. Each attribute ia  takes its value 
from the corresponding domain 
ia
D . Generally speaking, a finite set of candidate 
offers pO  acceptable to an agent p  (i.e., satisfying its hard constraints) is 
constructed via the Cartesian product 
1 2 na a a
D D D× × ×" . As human agents tend to 
specify their preferences in terms of a range of values, a more general offer 
representation may look like this: io =  100 200 5 6,40 60 200 300< − , − − , − >  for 
1a :=  “price” measured in terms of dollars, 2a :=  “warranty period” measured in 
terms of years, etc. If the price option is exactly 200  dollars, the computer-based 
representation becomes: io =  200 200 5 6,40 60 200 300< − , − − , − > .  
4.2 Preference Representation 
Preference representation is concerned about rating a set of potential offers according 
to an agent’s specific negotiation interests. The valuations of individual attributes and 
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attribute values (intervals) are defined by the valuation functions [0 1]ApU A: ,6  and 
[0 1]ai
i
D
p aU D: ,6  respectively, whereas ApU  is an agent p ’s valuation function for 
each attribute ia A∈ , and aiDpU  is an agent p ’s valuation function for each attribute 
value 
i ia a
d D∈ . In addition, the valuations of attributes are assumed normalized, that 
is, ( ) 1
i
A
p ia A
U a∈ =∑ . One common way to quantify an agent’s preference for an offer 
o  is by a linear aggregation of the valuations [2,17,36,39]:  
 ( ) ( ) ( )ai
i
i ai
Do A
p p i p a
a A d o
U o U a U d
∈ , ∈
= ×∑                                  (1) 
where ( )opU o  returns the utility of the offer o  from agent p ’s perspective, and 
ia
d  represents the range of attribute values (i.e., negotiation options) pertaining to the 
offer o .  
4.3 Concession Generation 
If an agent’s initial proposal is rejected by its opponent, it needs to propose an 
alternative offer with the least utility decrement (i.e., computing a concession). There 
are a variety of concession generation methods which underpin different negotiation 
models [2,7,12,14]. An effective concession generation method for sequential 
negotiations operates in the following way: An agent maintains a set  pO
′  which 
contains the offers it has proposed before (including the offer proposed in the current 
round). In each negotiation round, a counter-offer countero with a concession can be 
determined according to the expression:   { } { } [ ]counter p p x p p x p countero O O o O O o o′ ′∈ − ∈ −∃ ∀ : U , 
whereas x p yo oU  denotes that an offer yo  is more preferable than another offer xo . 
The above expression indicates that the counter-offer countero  is the most preferable 
offer from among the set of feasible offers which have not been proposed before. The 
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preference relation pU  is a total ordering induced by an agent p ’s utility function 
o
pU  over the set of feasible offers pO . In other words, the feasible offers of an agent 
p  are ranked in descending order of utility driven by ( )p pO,U . The concession 
mechanism works by picking an offer from the top of the list ranked by 
'( { })p p pO O, −U  in each negotiation round.  
4.4 Evaluation of the Opponents’ Offers 
When an incoming offer o  is received from the opponent, an agent p  first 
evaluates if po O∈  is true (i.e., the offer satisfying all its hard constraints). To carry 
out such a task, an equivalent offer o  should be computed. o  represents agent 
p ’s interpretation about the opponent’s proposal o . Once o  is computed, 
acceptance of the incoming offer o  can be determined with respect to p ’s own 
preference ( p pO,U ). An offer po O∈  is equivalent to o  if and only if every 
attribute interval of o  intersects each corresponding attribute interval of o . 
Formally, any two attribute intervals x yd d,  intersect if the intersection of the 
corresponding sets of points is not empty (i.e., x yd d∩ ≠∅ ). The acceptance criteria 
for an incoming offer o  (i.e., the equivalent o ) is defined by: (1) If 
x po O x p
o o∈∀ U , an agent p  should accept o  since it produces the maximal payoff; 
(2) If  po O
′∈  is true, an agent p  should accept o  because o  is one of the 
favorable proposals it makes before. If each participating agent p P∈  employs their 
preference ordering ( )p pO,U  to rank potential offers and uses the offer acceptability 
criteria described above to evaluate incoming offers, Pareto optimum [47] is always 
found if it does exist in a negotiation space [2]. 
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5. Knowledge Discovery for Multi-issue Negotiations 
The well-known data mining method, Apriori association rule mining [1], can 
progressively discover frequent item-sets for rule extractions. The measures of rule 
support (priori joint probability) and rule confidence (priori conditional probability) 
are used to evaluate the quality of the association rules extracted from frequent 
item-sets. Our approach of negotiation knowledge discovery is also based on 
computing the priori probabilities of the frequently requested items (e.g., negotiation 
issues and options) appearing in a negotiation history file. Typical Bayesian 
classification involves a training phase and a testing phase [35]. In the context of 
automated negotiation, the training phase refers to the extraction and cleaning up of 
the offer (counter-offer) information captured in a negotiation history file and the 
computation of the priori probabilities about offer acceptance (e.g., ( )Pr accept ). The 
computational details of how our novel knowledge discovery method is applied to the 
training phase will be illustrated in Section 5.1. During the testing phase, the naive 
Bayesian classifier estimates the likelihood that an arbitrary offer will be accepted by 
the negotiation opponent (e.g., ( )Pr accept o| ) according to the priori probabilities 
derived from the training phase. The computational details of how to apply the naive 
Bayesian classifier to negotiation decision making will be covered in Section 5.2.  
5.1 Mining opponents’ preferences based on negotiation history 
A generic negotiation knowledge discovery method should be developed such that it 
can be applied to a variety of negotiation mechanisms which may co-exist in an 
e-Marketplace. Therefore, the proposed knowledge discovery mechanism does not 
focus on estimating the specific parameter values of a particular negotiation formula. 
Moreover, a practical negotiation knowledge discovery method should be able to 
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discover an opponent’s preferences solely based on the public information available 
to a negotiation agent (e.g., the negotiation history). Negotiation knowledge discovery 
can be conducted before a negotiation process takes place. In particular, we would 
like to estimate the probability ( )Pr accept o| , that is the probability of the opponent 
accepting an arbitrary offer o  proposed by an agent p ; this posteriori probability 
can be computed based on the priori probabilities derived from a weighted negotiation 
history file. As naive Bayesian learning is computationally efficient [35], the 
proposed probabilistic knowledge discovery mechanism can be applied to extract the 
preference information of an opponent from the current negotiation session. Thereby, 
the most current preference of the opponent can be discovered even if its preference 
may change over time.  
 
Basically, a negotiation agent can keep a separate record for the negotiation dialogs 
with each opponent. Based on the individual negotiation history file, the preference 
mining mechanism can compute the priori probabilities such as ( )Pr accept  (i.e., the 
probability of the opponent accepting an arbitrary offer in general), ( )Pr reject  (i.e., 
the probability of the opponent rejecting an arbitrary offer in general), 
( )
ia
Pr d accept|  (i.e., the probability of a specific negotiation option appearing in an 
accepted offer of the opponent), and ( )
ia
Pr d reject|  (i.e., the probability of a 
specific negotiation option appearing in a rejected offer of the opponent).  
 
The basic intuition of our negotiation knowledge discovery method is that each 
counter-offer received from the opponent is considered an acceptable offer for that 
opponent (i.e., a positive training example). For a rational agent, it should accept the 
offer that it proposes. Moreover, if an agent proposes an offer and it is rejected by the 
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opponent, this offer should be treated as a negative training example. In our 
negotiation system, an agent maintains a separate negotiation history file for each of 
its opponents. With both positive and negative training examples, it is possible to 
construct a Bayesian classifier [35] for a negotiation agent to classify future offers 
(objects) as acceptable or not to the opponent. Nevertheless, we need to deal with the 
specific challenges of knowledge discovery from a negotiation history file. As a 
negotiation agent’s preference may change over time, the most recent negotiation 
session archived is more significant than the sessions archived long time ago in terms 
of inducing the agent’s current negotiation preference. Accordingly, the training 
examples extracted from the past and the present negotiation sessions should be 
weighted. This weighting procedure corresponds to the feature selection process in 
machine learning [35]. The weight ( )Sw i  of a negotiation session i  is computed 
according to:  
 
1
1( ) 1
S
S
iw i
S
ω
η ⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞−⎢ ⎥= × − ⎜ ⎟| |⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
                                       (2) 
where {1 2 ... }S n= , , ,  represents the set of negotiation sessions used for knowledge 
discovery. The most current session is assigned 1i =  and the previous session is 
assigned 1i i= + , etc. The scaling factor η  is used to convert the session weights 
from the unit interval [0 1],  to [0 ]η, . The parameter Sω  is used to control the rate 
of change of the session weight with respect to time. Dependent on the value of Sω  
specified, this rate of change could be linear or non-linear. For instance, most sessions 
(except the oldest few sessions) will be assigned a weight value close to η  if 
0 1Sω< <  is set. On the other hand, if 1Sω =  is set, the session weights are 
decreased linearly with respect to time.  
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In addition, the weight of each negotiation entry j  within a negotiation session i  
varies because of the concession making process. For instance, a counter-offer 
proposed by the opponent at the early stage is in general more preferable to the one 
proposed at a later stage within a negotiation session. In other words, it is more likely 
for the opponent to accept an arbitrary offer which consists of the negotiation options 
(i.e., attribute values) proposed by the opponent at the beginning of a negotiation 
session. Therefore, each entry j  in a negotiation session i  should also be weighted 
in chronological order. The second weight function ( )Ew i j,  for the j th entry of an 
archived negotiation session i  is defined according to:  
 ( )
1
1( ) ( ) ( ) ( 1)
E
E S S S
i
jw i j w i w i w i
E
ω⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞−⎢ ⎥, = − × − +⎜ ⎟| |⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
                   (3) 
where iE  is the set of entries (offers and counter-offers) of the i th negotiation 
session. The terms ( )Sw i  and ( 1)Sw i +  represent the session weights assigned to 
the i th and the ( 1i + )th sessions respectively. For the oldest session in a negotiation 
history file (i.e., ( 1)i S+ >| | ), the session weight ( 1) 0Sw i + =  is assumed. The 
parameter Eω  is used to control the rate of change of the entry weights with respect 
to time. If 1Eω =  is set, the entry weights are decreased linearly with respect to the 
chronological order of the entries within a session.  
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]. 
Table 2 shows an example of the weighted sample space which consists of 3 past 
negotiation sessions and 1 current negotiation session. The scaling factor 1000η =  
and 1S Eω ω= =  are assumed. The entries depicted at the bottom of Table 2 represent 
the dialogs between an agent and its opponent in the current negotiation session. In 
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fact, the weight assigned to each event in the negotiation history file can be 
interpreted as the additional sample points attached to that event. In Table 2, the 
weight assigned to each session or event is derived according to Eq.(2) and Eq.(3) 
respectively. According to Table 2, there are 6750 sample points in the sample space, 
and 31256750( ) 0 46Pr accept = = .  is estimated. Similarly, ( )Pr reject = 
3625
6750 0 54= . , (price 25 30 )Pr accept= − | = 937 53125 0 3. = . , (qty 10 20 )Pr reject= − |  =  
1125
3625 0 31= .  are derived from the events depicted in Table 2.  
 
However, one common difficulty of applying the Bayesian learning approach to solve 
real-world problems is how to deal with zero conditional probabilities for the rare 
features (also called the smoothing problem). We adopt the Laplace smoothing 
method [35] with a m -estimate to adjust the priori conditional probability 
distributions:  
 ( )
i
ij
a j
j
N mp
Pr d c
N m
+| = +                                           (4) 
where 
ia
d  is the issue value (i.e., option) of an offer and { }jc accept reject∈ ,  is the 
class label assigned to an offer in the training set (i.e., the negotiation history); the 
term ijN  represents the number of sample points assigned to the offers which contain 
issue value 
ia
d  from within the set of offers jO  with class label jc . The term jN  
is the total number of sample points assigned to the set of offers jO . The terms 
1
Np =  and m N=  are used to smooth probabilities of the rare events, whereas N  
represents the total number of unique features (i.e., issue values) found from the 
training set.  Basically, the zero conditional probability attached to a rare feature is 
replaced by a small number. For example, the conditional probability 
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(price 25 30 )Pr reject= − |  = 0 13625 12 0 00027++ = .  is estimated according to Eq.(4).  
 
5.2 Probabilistic Negotiation Decision Making 
The development of the proposed probabilistic negotiation mechanism for dynamic 
negotiation environments is driven by the basic intuition that rational negotiators 
strive for two possibly contradictory objectives [13,29]: (1) Maximizing self payoffs; 
(2) Maximizing the chance of reaching an agreement. The former can be computed 
according to a negotiator’s private utility function as discussed in Section 4, and the 
latter can be estimated based on the knowledge discovery mechanism illustrated in 
Section 5.1. We do not encode a very specific negotiation strategy in the decision 
making model to avoid the problem that the model only works well under the specific 
situations only. The preference relation pU  of a negotiation agent is a total ordering 
induced by the product of the agent’s private utility function opU  and the fraction of 
the probabilities ( )Pr accept o|  and ( )Pr reject o|  which basically characterizes the 
probability of acceptance of an offer o  by the opponent. In other words, the feasible 
offers of an agent p  are ranked in descending order according to:  
 
1 ( )( ) ( )
( )
o
p
Pr accept oRank o U o
Pr reject o
α
β⎡ ⎤|⎡ ⎤= × ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ |⎣ ⎦                            (5) 
 
 
(1 ) if  ( ) ( )
1 otherwise                                   
(1 )
Pr accept o Pr reject oα
β
α
− | ≥ |⎧⎪= ⎨⎪ −⎩
                      (6) 
 
where ( )Rank o  is the ranking function for an arbitrary offer o , and [0 1]α ∈ ,  is a 
trade-off factor for maximizing an agent’s own payoff or maximizing the chance of 
offer acceptance by the opponent. The trade-off factor α  is provided by the human 
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negotiator. Basically, the fraction ( )( )
Pr accept o
Pr reject o
|
|  is used to adjust the relative rank of the 
offer o . If ( ) ( )Pr accept o Pr reject o| ≥ |  is true, the original rank value derived 
according to the utility function ( )opU o  will be raised by 
( )
( )
Pr accept o
Pr reject o
|
|  times. On the 
other hand, if ( ) ( )Pr reject o Pr accept o| > |  is true, the original rank value computed 
based on the self utility function will be lowered by a fraction of ( )( )
Pr accept o
Pr reject o
|
| . In general, 
a large value of the trade-off factor α  implies that the agent would like to maximize 
its own payoff rather than considering the chance of offer acceptance by the opponent. 
For the extreme case such as 1α = , the term 1(1 )α−  in Eq.(6) is undefined. According 
to our current implementation, the fraction 1(1 )α−  will return zero when 1α =  is 
used to instantiate a negotiation agent. On the other hand, when 0α =  is specified 
(i.e., an agent only considers the chance of offer acceptance), the term 1α  is 
undefined. Under such circumstance, a default value of zero will be returned 
according to our current implementation.  
 
As the time dimension is always an important issue for practical negotiations [34,48], 
our probabilistic negotiation mechanism also takes into account the time pressure. The 
basic intuition is that when the negotiation deadline is approaching, an agent is more 
likely to concede in order to make a deal [48]. Therefore, the trade-off factor should 
automatically be adjusted by: ( )TP tα α= × , where ( )TP t  represents the time 
pressure function. Our time pressure function 
1
min( )
( ) 1
epd
p
d
p
t t
TP t
t
⎛ ⎞,= − ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 is similar to 
the negotiation decision function referred to in the literature [8,12]. The term ( )TP t  
denotes the time pressure given the time t  represented by the absolute elapsed time 
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or the elapsed number of negotiation rounds; dpt  indicates the deadline for an agent 
p . The term pe  is used to model the “concession attitude” of the agent p . In each 
negotiation round, a counter-offer with the least amount of concession (in terms of the 
least decrement of own payoff and the chance of acceptability) is picked up from the 
top of the list  ( { })p p pO O
′, −U  ranked by an agent p  using Eq.(5).  
 
Once the counter-offer is determined, it will be added to the set pO
′ . The revised pO
′  
forms the basis to evaluate the incoming offers. For example, if the opponent 
proposes an offer o  which just happens to be found in pO
′  in the current 
negotiation round, this means that an agreement is found. The probability of 
acceptance of an offer o  can be computed according to Bayes theorem [10]:  
 
( ) ( )
( )
( )
j j
j
Pr o c Pr c
Pr c o
Pr o
| ×| =                                    (7) 
where { }jc accept reject∈ , . If the naive assumption of feature (i.e., negotiation 
option) independency is made, the priori probability ( )jPr o c|  can be approximated 
by:  
 ( ) ( )
i
ai
j a j
d o
Pr o c Pr d c
∈
| = |∏                                      (8) 
By the addition rule of probability theory, 
1
( ) ( ) ( )n j jjPr o Pr o c Pr c== | ×∑  is held. 
Therefore, the probability of acceptance (rejection) of an offer o  by the opponent 
can be estimated according to:  
 
  
(9) 
 
 
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
i
ai
i i
a ai i
a
d o
a a
d o d o
Pr accept Pr d accept
Pr accept o
Pr accept Pr d accept Pr reject Pr d reject
∈
∈ ∈
× |
| = × | + × |
∏
∏ ∏
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6. The Experiments and Results 
We adopted an experimental research methodology to evaluate the merits of the 
proposed knowledge discovery method and the associated probabilistic negotiation 
decision making mechanism. Our e-Marketplace was instantiated on a server machine 
with a Pentium-4 2.2GHz single processor and 1 GB main memory. To avoid the 
communication overheads, all the experiments were conducted under an Intranet 
environment. Both effectiveness (in terms of individual payoffs and joint payoffs) and 
efficiency (in terms of negotiation rounds) of the negotiation processes were 
evaluated.  
Experiment One  
The first experiment aimed at evaluating the effectiveness of the probabilistic 
negotiation knowledge discovery method under a bi-lateral negotiation situation. The 
negotiation space was characterized by five attributes (i.e., 5A| |= ), and each 
attribute domain contained 5  discrete values represented by the natural numbers 
{1 2 3 4 5}
ia
D = , , , , . For each agent p , the size of the feasible offer set is: 
55 3 125pO| |= = , . The utility functions of the buyer agent and the seller agent are 
depicted in Table 3. The negotiation deadline was set to 3 125,  rounds. In other 
words, there was no time pressure for the negotiation agents.  
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]. 
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
i
ai
i i
a ai i
a
d o
a a
d o d o
Pr reject Pr d reject
Pr reject o
Pr accept Pr d accept Pr reject Pr d reject
∈
∈ ∈
× |
| = × | + × |
∏
∏ ∏
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For the first simulated e-Marketplace, two negotiation agents developed according to 
the negotiation mechanism described in Section 4, that is, the Pareto optimal (PO) 
model, were deployed. The offer proposed by the buyer (Agent 1) was accepted by 
the seller (agent 2) at the 1 482, th negotiation round. The joint-utility was 0.55 
(Agent 1) +  0.6 (Agent 2) = 1.15, a Pareto optimal outcome. For the second 
simulated e-Marketplace, we deployed two negotiation agents developed using 
random negotiation strategy (RAN), that is, a counter-offer was randomly chosen 
from the set  { }p pO O
′−  for each agent p  at each negotiation round. The 
negotiation outcome 0.7 (Agent 1) +  0.29 (Agent 2) = 0.99 was achieved at the 
701th negotiation round. The third simulated e-Marketplace involved the probabilistic 
negotiation agents empowered by the knowledge discovery mechanism (KD). In order 
to construct a training set, the negotiation history generated by the PO model was 
made available to the probabilistic negotiation agents. In particular, the top 40%  (in 
chronological order) of the entries in the negotiation history file was used to construct 
the training set. Based on such a training set, each agent in the KD model could 
estimate the probability of offer acceptance according to the method discussed in 
Section 5.1 and ranked the set of potential offers according to Eq.(5). The following 
parameters were applied to the KD model: 0 55 100 000 1 5p S Eeα η ω ω= . , = , , = , = = . 
An agreement was reached at the 312 th round with a joint utility of 0.56 (Agent 1) 
+  0.57 (Agent 2) = 1.13. We also tested the negotiation effectiveness if only one 
probabilistic negotiation agent was involved in the negotiation process. For the forth 
simulated e-Marketplace, the buyer was represented by a probabilistic negotiation 
agent with initial knowledge about the preference of the seller. On the other hand, the 
seller agent was developed according to the Pareto optimal model described in 
Section 4. We named this combination as the (KD-1) model. For this model, an 
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agreement was reached at the 415 th negotiation round with a joint utility of 0.42 
(Agent 1) +  0.69 (Agent 2) = 1.11.  
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]. 
Figure 2 depicts the negotiation outcomes achieved by different negotiation models. 
The Pareto Frontier highlights the good solutions pertaining to that particular 
negotiation space. A solution which is located near the Pareto Frontier is better than 
another one which is located far away from the Frontier. As can be seen, the outcome 
achieved by the KD model is close to the Pareto optimum and it is much better than 
that achieved by the RAN model. To quantitatively measure the closeness of a 
negotiation outcome with respect to the Pareto optimum, we used the Euclidean 
distance metric [10]: 2 2
1
( , ) ( )x yx y i iidist s s u u
| |
== −∑G G , where x ys s,  are two solutions 
projected to a utility space as displayed at Figure 2 and xiu  represents the utility 
achieved by the i th agent. The smaller distance of a negotiation solution from the 
Pareto optimum, the better the solution is. For instance, the distance of the solution 
found by the KD model to the Pareto optimum is 0 03. , and the distance between the 
solution of the RAN model and the Pareto optimum is 0 34. . Therefore, the outcome 
produced by the KD model is better than that of the RAN model.  
 
Even if only one agent was empowered with the probabilistic knowledge discovery 
mechanism, an agreement could still be reached faster than that achieved by the PO 
model. However, the negotiation effectiveness of the KD-1 model is inferior to that of 
the KD model according to the Euclidean distance. The outcome achieved by the 
KD-1 model is 0 16.  unit away from the Pareto optimum, whereas the outcome 
produced by the KD model is only 0 03.  unit away from the optimum. In terms of 
self payoff, it seems that a more even distribution of payoff is achieved by individual 
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agents if both agents were empowered by the knowledge discovery mechanism. This 
experiment shows that the probabilistic knowledge discovery method is effective, and 
the corresponding KD negotiation model can identify a near optimal solution (in 
terms of Euclidean distance) with much less negotiation time. The KD model 
improves negotiation efficiency by 79% . Figure 3 compares the concession pattern 
of the KD agents with that of the PO agents. The main reason why the KD model can 
reach an agreement quicker is that the deals which are less likely to be accepted by the 
opponent are ignored by the agents. Consequently, the concession period is shortened 
as shown in Figure 3. 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE]. 
Experiment Two  
In this experiment, we tried to simulate a more realistic negotiation environment, that 
is, with negotiation time pressure. In typical e-Commerce settings, agents have to find 
solutions based on limited resources (e.g., time). In this experiment, we set a 
negotiation deadline of 300  rounds. Since the Pareto optimal negotiation mechanism 
PO takes a long time to find an agreement in general, it is with no match with our 
probabilistic negotiation mechanism KD. Therefore, we compared the performance of 
the KD model with that of the TDT model [36]. As the TDT model was mainly 
applied to deal with real value domains [8,12,36], we converted the real numbers 
generated from the TDT formulas to integers (discrete negotiation options) by 
truncation in this experiment. The parameters 1β =  and 0 1K = .  were employed 
since they were the typical choices in previous experiments [9,12,36].  
[INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE]. 
Basically, the negotiation scenario and the parameters for the KD model adopted in 
experiment one were applied to this experiment. Figure 4 shows the negotiation 
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outcomes achieved by the various negotiation models when time pressure exists. The 
KD model reached an agreement with joint utility 0.58 (Agent 1) +  0.54 (Agent 2) 
= 1.12. The TDT model found a solution with joint utility 0.56 (Agent 1) +  0.51 
(Agent 2) = 1.07. The RAN model found a solution with joint utility 0.4 (Agent 1) +  
0.58 (Agent 2) = 0.98. The PO model was deterministic and it could not find a 
solution before the 1482 th round. As a result, it produced zero joint-utility under the 
deadline of 300  rounds. The solution found by the KD model is still close to the 
Pareto Frontier. As showed in this experiment, the probabilistic knowledge discovery 
method is effective and the KD model outperforms all the other negotiation models 
when limited resources (e.g., time) is available for bargaining. When the deadline is 
approaching, the probabilistic negotiation mechanism will lower the value of the 
trade-off factor α  which controls maximizing the agent’s self payoff. At the same 
time, the weight for optimizing offer acceptance is increased. As a result, the KD 
model is able to find a promising negotiation solution even under great time pressure.  
 
7. Conclusions and Future Work 
With the rapid growth of e-Commerce, many e-Marketplaces have been established to 
facilitate trading among geographically distributed service consumers and providers. 
However, existing negotiation models are weak in supporting multi-issue bargaining 
in e-Marketplaces because these models often assume that complete information 
about the negotiation spaces is available. This paper illustrates the design and 
development of a novel negotiation knowledge discovery method to alleviate the 
weakness of existing negotiation mechanisms. The proposed knowledge discovery 
method can help a negotiation agent to discover the preferences of its opponents 
based on the series of offer exchanges captured in a negotiation history file. Armed 
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with this knowledge, negotiation agents can identify mutually beneficial deals 
efficiently, and hence leading to the “win-win” business negotiation outcomes. Our 
experimental results show that the probabilistic negotiation mechanism empowered 
by the novel knowledge discovery method outperforms the Pareto optimal negotiation 
model and the TDT negotiation model under realistic negotiation conditions such as 
the presence of time pressure. Our research work opens the door to the development 
of practical negotiation mechanisms to support modern e-Marketplaces. Future work 
includes a direct comparison of our method with other utility discovery methods. 
Moreover, Bayesian belief network will be explored to represent the dependency 
among the negotiation issues. A more sophisticated negotiation protocol will also be 
examined to support optimal multi-party multi-issue negotiations. Finally, an 
extended study of the human behavioral aspects of the negotiation model will be 
conducted. 
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Hungarian Buyer    
Currency (1)  Price (2)  Delivery (3) Dispute Settlement (4)  
Hungarian (1)  180 000,  (1) 6 months (1) Hungary (1)   
Euro $ (2)  195 000,  (2) 8 months (2) ICC (2)   
U.S. $ (3)  210 000,  (3) 12 months (3) London (3)   
Others (4)  225 000,  (4) 14 months (4) U.S. court (4)   
U.S. Seller    
Currency (4)  Price (2)  Delivery (1) Dispute Settlement (3)  
Hungarian (4)  180 000,  (4) 6 months (4) Hungary (4)   
Euro $ (3)  195 000,  (3) 8 months (3) ICC (3)   
U.S. $ (1)  210 000,  (2) 12 months (2) London (2)   
Others (2)  225 000,  (1) 14 months (1) U.S. court (1)   
Table 1.  A Stylized Multi-Issue International Business Negotiation 
 
Session  Offers  Price  Shipment 
Time  
QTY  Opponent  
Accept 
Weights  
4   1o   5 10−  1 2−   20 30−  N  250   
 
2o   15 20−  3 4−   50 50−  Y  187.5   
 
3o   1 2−  2 2−   10 20−  N  125   
 
4o   25 30−  5 8−   60 100−  Y  62.5   
3   1o   5 10−  1 2−   20 30−  N  500   
 
2o   15 20−  3 4−   50 50−  Y  437.5   
 
3o   1 2−  2 2−   10 20−  N  375   
 
4o   25 30−  5 8−   60 100−  Y  312.5   
2   1o   5 10−  1 2−   20 30−  N  750   
 
2o   15 20−  3 4−   50 50−  Y  687.5   
 
3o   1 2−  2 2−   10 20−  N  625   
 
4o   25 30−  5 8−   60 100−  Y  562.5   
1  1o   5 10−  1 2−   20 30−  N  1000   
 
2o   15 20−  3 4−   50 50−  Y  875   
Table 2. A Weighted Negotiation History 
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Buyer Agent: 1p    
1
( ) 0 1ApU price = .
  
1
( ) 0 1ApU qty = .  1 ( ) 0 2ApU size = .
  
1
( ) 0 3ApU delivery = .
  
1
( ) 0 3ApU warranty = .
   
1
priceD
pU   1
qtyD
pU   1
sizeD
pU   1
deliveryD
pU   1
warrantyD
pU    
1 1
( ) 0 9priceDpU d = .  1 1( ) 0 9qtyDpU d = .
  
1 1
( ) 0 8sizeDpU d = .
  
1 1
( ) 0 9deliveryDpU d = . 1 1( ) 0 9warrantyDpU d = .  
1 2
( ) 0 8priceDpU d = .  1 2( ) 0 8qtyDpU d = .
  
1 2
( ) 0 7sizeDpU d = .
  
1 2
( ) 0 6deliveryDpU d = . 1 2( ) 0 8warrantyDpU d = .  
1 3
( ) 0 7priceDpU d = .  1 3( ) 0 7qtyDpU d = .
  
1 3
( ) 0 6sizeDpU d = .
  
1 3
( ) 0 53deliveryDpU d = . 1 3( ) 0 5warrantyDpU d = .  
1 4
( ) 0 6priceDpU d = .  1 4( ) 0 5qtyDpU d = .
  
1 4
( ) 0 3sizeDpU d = .
  
1 4
( ) 0 3deliveryDpU d = . 1 4( ) 0 3warrantyDpU d = .  
1 5
( ) 0 5priceDpU d = .  1 5( ) 0 2qtyDpU d = .
  
1 5
( ) 0 1sizeDpU d = .
  
1 5
( ) 0 1deliveryDpU d = . 1 5( ) 0 2warrantyDpU d = .  
Seller Agent: 2p    
2
( ) 0 1ApU price = .
  
2
( ) 0 1ApU qty = .
  
2
( ) 0 2ApU size = .
  
2
( ) 0 3ApU delivery = .
  
2
( ) 0 3ApU warranty = .
   
2
priceD
pU   2
qtyD
pU   2
sizeD
pU   2
deliveryD
pU   2
warrantyD
pU    
2 1
( ) 0 1priceDpU d = .  2 1( ) 0 2qtyDpU d = .
  
2 1
( ) 0 1sizeDpU d = . 2 1( ) 0 2deliveryDpU d = . 2 1( ) 0 2warrantyDpU d = .  
2 2
( ) 0 2priceDpU d = .  2 2( ) 0 3qtyDpU d = .
  
2 2
( ) 0 3sizeDpU d = .
  
2 2
( ) 0 3deliveryDpU d = . 2 2( ) 0 3warrantyDpU d = .  
2 3
( ) 0 3priceDpU d = .  2 3( ) 0 5qtyDpU d = .
  
2 3
( ) 0 5sizeDpU d = .
  
2 3
( ) 0 4deliveryDpU d = . 2 3( ) 0 5warrantyDpU d = .  
2 4
( ) 0 6priceDpU d = .  2 4( ) 0 8qtyDpU d = .
  
2 4
( ) 0 6sizeDpU d = .
  
2 4
( ) 0 6deliveryDpU d = . 2 4( ) 0 7warrantyDpU d = .  
2 5
( ) 0 9priceDpU d = .  2 5( ) 0 9qtyDpU d = .
  
2 5
( ) 0 9sizeDpU d = .
  
2 5
( ) 0 8deliveryDpU d = . 2 5( ) 0 9warrantyDpU d = .  
Table 3. The Negotiation Space for a Bi-lateral Negotiation Situation 
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Figure 1. Software Agents Mediated e-Marketplace 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Negotiation Outcomes Achieved by Various Models (No Time Pressure) 
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Figure 3. Comparison of the Concession Patterns: KD vs. PO 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Negotiation Outcomes Achieved by Various Models (Under Time Pressure) 
